The Macroeconomic Context for Trade in Guinea Bissau by Kyle, Steven C.
WP 2009-26 
July 2009 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
Department of Applied Economics and Management 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York  14853-7801  USA 
 
 
 
The Macroeconomic Context for Trade in 
Guinea Bissau 
 
Steven Kyle 
 
 
 
It is the Policy of Cornell University actively to support equality of educational 
and employment opportunity.  No person shall be denied admission to any 
educational program or activity or be denied employment on the basis of any 
legally prohibited discrimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as 
race, color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or handicap.  
The University is committed to the maintenance of affirmative action 
programs which will assure the continuation of such equality of opportunity. 
Abstract 
 
The Macroeconomic Context for Trade 
In Guinea Bissau 
 
Steven Kyle 
 
 This paper surveys the current macroeconomic situation in Guinea Bissau in light 
of proposals to increase the integration of the country with international markets.  Major 
issues are continuing instability in the government, poor infrastructure (particularly the 
port) and a very high degree of dependence on one export – cashew.
 1
 The Macroeconomic Context for Trade 
In Guinea Bissau1
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Guinea Bissau is a small country of 1.6 million and 36,120 square kilometers 
located on the west coast of Africa between Senegal on the north and Guinea on the south 
and east. (See map in Figure 1) Both cross-border and sea-borne trade are important with 
exports amounting to more than 40% of GDP and imports more than 50%.  . 
 
The case of Guinea Bissau is much influenced by four important facts.  First, 
Guinea Bissau has an extremely high level of dependence on a single export - cashew, 
which is grown by the vast majority of peasant farmers in the country, covers close to 5% 
of the total land area, and accounts for 98% of export revenue as well as 17% of 
government revenue.  Second,  Guinea Bissau suffers from an extremely degraded 
infrastructural base, with both roads and port facilities receiving little maintenance or 
improvement in the years since independence in 1975 and still suffering  from the effects 
of the civil war that took place in 1998-99.  Third, Guinea Bissau is heavily dependent on 
imports of its most important staple food, rice, and has therefore been hit hard by the 
recent spike in world rice prices. Fourth, fish exports are a major source of government 
revenues, even though they do not figure in trade data.  Licensing of foreign flagged 
vessels fishing in Guinea Bissau waters but landing their catch in other countries has 
accounted for over 50% of government revenues in the recent past.  
 
 
   
II.  The Macroeconomic Context for Trade,  Growth, and Poverty Reduction 
 
A. Poverty and Growth 
 
Guinea Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world, with more than two 
thirds of the population falling below $2/day income and more than 21% below $1.2  It is 
175 out of 177 on the Human Development Index.  Literacy is low at approximately one 
third of the population and while primary school enrollment is between 55 and 60% there 
is a much lower primary school completion rate than these figures might suggest.  At 45 
years, life expectancy is among the lowest anywhere.  Table 1 shows summary data for 
key social and economic indicators over the past several years.  
 The government has produced a strategy to reduce poverty in the country called 
the DENARP (Documento de Estrategia de Reducao da Pobreza) issued in 2006.  While 
some updating would be useful in this document, on the whole the situation today is 
                                                 
1 This paper was written as a contribution to Guinea Bissau’s forthcoming Diagnostic Trade 
Integration Study. 
2 See UNDP Human Development Report 2006 
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largely unchanged and the DENARP is still an accurate statement of the government’s 
intentions.  In the most general terms, the strategy endorses four pillars:  modernizing 
public administration while improving governance and working to ensure 
macroeconomic stability;  promoting economic growth; increasing access to social 
services and public infrastructure; and improving the living conditions of the most 
vulnerable.  However, with two thirds of the population living in poverty it is clear that 
this is a major undertaking and will take time to accomplish. 
 The majority of the extremely poor live in rural areas;  almost three quarters of 
the poorest third of Guineans earn their primary income from agriculture and almost all 
of the remainder in this tercile list agriculture as their second most important source of 
income.  The middle tercile of the income distribution also is predominantly agricultural, 
with more than 60% listing this as their primary source of income. (See Boubacar-Sid et 
al. 2007) 
 Thus it is essential to improve agricultural incomes if poverty is to be addressed in 
any meaningful and sustainable way.  The intersection of poverty and trade is clear.  The 
main cash crop in the country, cashew, is also the main export. The main staple grain, 
rice, is one of the main imports. The Government’s trade policy with respect to these two 
crops will be key to its success in reducing poverty.  Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 2, 
overall growth in the economy tracks growth in cashew production quite closely. 
 The vast majority of the cashew crop is produced by small farmers.  Indeed, in 
many areas it is hard to find small farmers who do not grow at least some cashew.  This is 
extremely important in that it means that changes in the farm gate price or production of 
cashews have a greater impact on the incomes of the poorest than any other variable in 
the economy.  One study by Boubacar-Sid et al. concluded that a 15% increase in the 
farm gate price of cashew could result in an increase in consumption of the extreme poor 
of 9.5% and by the poor of 3.3%. 
 Rice is the traditional staple grain and accounts for nearly two thirds of the grain 
production in the country and three quarters of consumption, with the difference being 
made up by imports.  Rice production has stagnated in recent years and it has been 
observed that many farmers have switched to cashew production, preferring to barter this 
for rice rather than grow it themselves.  Clearly, labor requirements for cashew 
production are far less than those for rice production, but there is in principle no reason 
why the two crops should conflict in terms of land allocation, particularly given the ready 
availability of fallow land in many parts of the country.  However, as noted in other parts 
of this report, rice production could easily surpass domestic needs given yield 
improvements which would seem to be within reach.   
 Of particular importance, however, is the obvious responsiveness of poor farmers 
to price and market incentives that are available to them.  As the cashew sector took off 
during the 90’s many farmers switched to this crop, with a consequent negative effect on 
growth in rice production.  The current spike in world grain prices, including rice, should 
produce a response from small farmers in terms of their own output as the terms of trade 
between cashew and rice deteriorates. 
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 B. Recent Economic Performance 
 Guinea Bissau suffered a short but intense civil war in 1998/99 which is estimated 
to have destroyed 40% of the economy.  A period of political instability followed until 
the President was removed through a bloodless coup in 2003.  Fresh Presidential 
elections were held in 2005 after which the country has begun to rebuild.  In 2008, the 
country is still recovering from the destruction and economic dislocation that resulted.  
Indeed, large parts of the countryside remain inaccessible during the rainy season and 
access is difficult even at the best of times. 
The economy recovered strongly in 1999 and 2000, before stagnating again in the 
period 2001-03.  Average economic growth picked up to 3.4% by the end of 2005, but 
deteriorated sharply in 2006 due to problems in marketing the country’s cashew crop.  In 
2007 growth was just 2.7% due to late rains and consequently lower rice production, but 
rose to 3.1% in 2008.   
Declining terms of trade also took a toll, with declining cashew prices and higher 
oil prices. (See Figure 3) This problem has worsened further in 2008 as world oil prices 
and rice import prices have spiked higher.  With population growth close to 3%, per 
capita income declined over the period from 2001-2007.  Overall, Guinea Bissau is 
growing significantly more slowly than other countries in the WAEMU region. 
Inflation has  been low, thanks largely to Guinea Bissau’s membership in the 
CFAF monetary zone, though it has risen somewhat in the past year.  Inflation was 4.6% 
in 2007 but increased to10.5%, in 2008,  significantly higher than other members of the 
WAEMU region.  Broad money growth amounting to 25% in 2007 played an important 
role in generating this result, and the same figure registered growth of 22% at the end of 
November 2008.  As can be seen in Figure 4, increases in food prices played a major role 
in inflation. 
The government remains heavily indebted with external debt amounting to more 
than $670 million as of the end of 2006 – if domestic obligations are added to this, debt 
service falling due in 2007 amounted to 84% of budgetary revenues and 130% of tax 
revenues not counting arrears from previous periods.  The authorities have concentrated 
efforts in the second half of 2007 and in early 2008 on stabilizing the fiscal situation of 
the government by improving budgetary controls and increasing revenue, particularly 
from customs.  High public sector wage bills have been identified as a particular problem 
needing to be addressed.  In spite of progress in this area, the country remains dependent 
on donors to bridge remaining financial gaps.  See Figure 5 
 Table 2 shows the sectoral distribution of GDP for the years since 2003.  
Agriculture is by far the most important sector, accounting for about 60% of the total.  
Commerce is next in importance at about 16% while industry (which includes utilities) 
amounts to a maximum of 9%, only slightly more than public administration.  These facts 
underscore the observation that higher GDP growth requires adequate growth in 
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agriculture, even if there is success in diversifying into other sectors.  This is equally true 
for poverty reduction since 80% of the population and the vast majority of the poorest are 
engaged in agriculture. 
The government’s fiscal balance is still quite precarious in that expenditures 
financed from donors or outstanding obligations to the BCEAO have remained quite 
large.  The financing gap in 2007 amounted to 21.3 billion CFAF and was projected to 
remain at approximately this level in 2008 unless additional measures could be 
implemented.  In discussions with external donors the government pledged to make 
additional efforts to improve tax collection and to minimize recourse to domestic bank 
financing.  Extremely tight spending limits have been imposed in all areas as well as 
improved expenditure controls through the Treasury and the BCEAO.  Donor support is, 
however, essential to closing remaining financing gaps.  The high prices for cashew in 
2008 will help relieve some of the pressure being felt. 
 
 In order to address issues requiring investment in key sectors such as 
infrastructure, it will be important for fiscal restraint to be quite tight in other areas.  
Recent discussions with the IMF have focused on the extent to which the public sector 
wage bill may crowd out other needs such as those that may be identified in this study.   
Table 3 shows figures on the sources of tax revenue in recent years.  Tax receipts are 
relatively stable compared to total revenue and amounted to about three quarters of total 
receipts in the most recent year for which information is available. 
 
Also important will be the role of the government’s internal and external debt 
overhang in crowding out priority expenditures.  Though Guinea Bissau is a candidate for 
debt relief it is likely that there will be a substantial burden even after relief is achieved.  
Long term international debt amounted to approximately $830 million at year end 2007, 
though debt relief amounting to $180 million was reportedly approved by the Paris Club 
in February 2008.  Even the lower debt remaining after relief is still quite high when 
compared to GDP at slightly more than $300 million. (See Africa Research Bulletin 
March 2008)  Table 4 shows Guinea Bissau’s current situation in terms of external debt. 
 
C. Trade Performance 
 
 Tables 5, 6 and 7 show recent trade performance in Guinea Bissau.  Table 8 and 
Figure 6  show the Balance of Payments.  On the export side the importance of cashew 
nuts is obvious, with no other export item amounting to even 1% of the value of this 
crop3.  On the import side food is the most important, particularly rice and flour.  Next in 
importance are petroleum products, a figure that is undoubtedly larger in 2007 and 2008 
due to the massive price increases over the past year.  Non-registered trade is nearly a 
third of the total. 
 
                                                 
3 However, fishing licenses do account for significant revenue though they are not counted as 
merchandise exports. 
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 Table 5 shows trading partners for Guinea Bissau.  On the export side, India is by 
far the largest as it is the destination of the bulk of cashew exports.  Nigeria is next in 
importance followed by a variety of other countries.  On the import side Portugal is the 
most important, followed by Italy.  The European Union is the dominant import source 
overall. 
 
 Guinea Bissau is a member of ECOWAS and the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU).  It shares the common currency of WAEMU, the CFA franc, 
which is pegged to the Euro, and the Central Bank of WAEMU, the BCEAO.  
Accordingly, there is no scope for exchange rate management by policy makers.  
However, there remains the potential for significant third party exchange rate effects 
given the sharp deterioration of the US dollar over the past several years – indeed, the 
dollar is now 50% lower than it was only a little more than five years ago.  Insofar as 
Guinea Bissau trades with the US or other countries which link their currencies to the US 
dollar, this can be expected to have an effect on international trade.  In addition, the 
principal export crop, cashew, is priced in dollars on international markets and there may 
be some tendency for a decline in its CFAF price as the dollar falls. 
 
 WAEMU has a clear agenda of long term regional economic integration, having 
adopted a common external tariff in 2000 and an internal free trade zone.  Guinea Bissau 
has adopted the common external tariff but has exempted rice imports from the normal 
levy in order to lower food prices.  Implementation of the free trade zone still has some 
distance to go in terms of completely freeing cross border trade from all impediments.   
 
 The other immediate priorities in trade policy are the negotiation of a common 
external tariff for ECOWAS, and the negotiation of an Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) between ECOWAS and the European Union.  ECOWAS is considering adoption 
of the WAEMU common external tariff, but Nigeria has proposed the addition of a fifth 
tariff band, possibly as high as 50%.  In the case of the EPA, the December 31, 2007 
deadline for expiry of the trade preferences in the Cotonou Agreement has past, with a 
compromise arrangement that has LDCs including Guinea Bissau reverting to the 
Everything But Arms agreement.  However, ECOWAS remains committed to a full EPA 
which would involve considerable liberalization of EU imports.  Guinea Bissau will need 
to examine carefully the risks and options available in both of these cases.   
 
 
 
  
D.  Exchange Rate and Real Exchange Rate 
 
 
 The real exchange rate is probably the single most important macroeconomic 
variable affecting incentives to export and import.  In Guinea Bissau the government’s 
ability to affect the real exchange rate is limited by its membership in the BCEAO and its 
use of the CFA, which has a fixed exchange rate vis a vis the euro.  This means that 
changes in the real exchange rate can come from only two sources – First and most 
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important is changes in the domestic price level which result in inflation differentials 
between Guinea Bissau and its trading partners.  The second is third party effects where 
changes in exchange rates between the euro/CFA area and e.g. the dollar, alter incentives 
to trade. 
 
 Overall, the real exchange rate for Guinea Bissau has remained stable for the past 
decade as the value of the RER for Guinea Bissau has tracked closely that of the rest of 
the WAEMU area.  As noted above, this is in line with inflation performance, which has 
been quite close to that of its monetary partners, though these are not its major trading 
partners (See Figure 7).  However, inflation surged at the end of 2007 and in 2008, 
largely due to increases in the world prices of food and oil, with a  figure of 10.5% 
registered in 2008 after a much lower 3.7% average during the first 11 months in 2007.   
 
 However, though inflation is typically a major issue in real exchange rate 
movements and relative competitiveness vis a vis other countries, to the extent Guinea 
Bissau’s inflation stems from factors affecting all of its trading partners, its relative 
position will remain largely the same insofar as imports are equally important in each of 
the countries.  Clearly this is the case in both world oil and grain markets, though of 
course governments have some ability to affect actual domestic prices of the commodities 
involved, and the extent of pass-through to domestic prices may vary across countries.   
 
 To the extent that Guinea Bissau’s inflation is greater than other WAEMU 
countries, it will lose competitiveness vis a vis its neighbors (but not necessarily with its 
major trading partners since Guinea Bissau’s exports consist mainly of cashew, which is 
not the case with its neighbors).  Inflation in the EU zone is well below that in GB, 
indicating that a real appreciation has in fact occurred vis a vis one of the country’s most 
important trading partners.  Given the sharp appreciation of the Euro vis a vis the dollar, 
it is also clear that GB has experienced a sharp appreciation vis a vis the USA and dollar-
linked currencies. 
 
 Looking at the historical record (See Figures 2 and 3), Guinea Bissau has been 
largely free from major shifts in its RER since 1994, a period spanning its civil war and 
the consequent massive economic upheaval.  The post-war period has seen major inflows 
of foreign assistance, something which would in ordinary circumstances give rise to some 
symptoms of Dutch Disease.  That this did not happen can be attributed to the large 
amount of excess productive capacity resulting from the approximately 40% drop in GDP 
during the war.  As long as most sectors are in a position to easily expand supply, and/or 
aid is heavily import-intensive, foreign funded increases in aggregate demand could take 
place with relatively small inflationary impacts. 
 
 This phase is evidently coming to an end given the inflation performance of the 
past year.  Some supply side bottlenecks are becoming apparent and the risk of inflation 
is consequently higher than before and likely to remain so, particularly given the sharp 
increases in the prices of important traded goods on the both the export and import sides. 
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E.  Mineral Income and Macroeconomic Stability 
 
 The prospect of significant mineral income from phosphate mining, bauxite and 
possibly oil gives the question of real exchange rate movements particular importance in 
looking toward the future.  Given the estimates that income from these sources could 
amount to as much as 30% of GDP  the possibility of Dutch Disease or Resource Curse 
distortions are not at all academic – rather, they are a virtual certainty. 
 
 Judging from conversations with various government officials, there is no 
awareness of these issues.  Several were aware of the issues associated with transparency 
in the disposal of mineral income (adherence to the EITI recommendations is discussed 
below in the context of mineral income) but the idea that even perfectly transparent 
accounting could nevertheless result in economic problems given the size and distribution 
of spending was not something that was at all understood. 
 
 Briefly, a common pattern would be to see increasing expenditure in the central 
apparatus of the government and in the capital city, while the inflation occasioned by 
these expenses resulted in an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  The increased costs 
of inputs such as labor and transport would in turn adversely affect producers of other 
traded goods (e.g. cashew and rice) who would not themselves benefit from the mineral 
revenue.  Commonly suggested solutions to this problem are to smooth the time profile of 
expenditures through some offshore savings mechanism and to focus on investments with 
a major import content and/or that can reduce costs and preserve the viability of activities 
in which the country has an underlying comparative advantage.   
 
 However, a first step is to engage in awareness-raising and educational efforts to 
alert the government’s leading economic policy makers to the issues involved.  Seminars 
using examples from the recent history of other Sub Saharan countries could be quite 
productive. 
 
 
 
III.   The Policy Reform Process 
 
A.  Policy Reform – The Importance of an Effective Process  
 
While there is a general consensus that significant improvements are required in the 
policy and regulatory environment in order to facilitate private sector investment and 
growth, specific efforts for improvement have rarely met with success.  Key factors that 
contribute to the impasse in the reform process include:  
 
1. The internal instability of the Government with frequent changes of ministers and 
ministerial staffs.  This tendency has accelerated since the civil war with several 
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ministries, including the Ministry of Commerce, experiencing an almost yearly 
turnover;  
 
2. The ambiguous distribution of power, with the executive authority being split 
between the elected President and a Prime Minister who is appointed by 
parliament;   
 
3. The lack of adequate analytical and technical capability within the Government to 
prepare solid and well reasoned proposals for policy reform;   
 
4. The absence of a structured public-private sector consultative mechanism to 
achieve consensus on reform priorities and monitor the implementation of reform 
policies. 
 
A recent World Bank study4 analyzes the policy reform process in a number of 
countries (Botswana, Cape Verde, Malaysia, Mauritius, and Taiwan) which have 
experienced rapid growth and poverty reduction, and concludes that the key element 
which these countries had in common was the presence of a small dedicated and 
empowered reform team.  These teams shared certain characteristics in that they were 
apolitical in nature and enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, engaged the private sector 
but kept them at arm’s length, remained one step removed from the political frontline, 
and had access to resources.  This way they were able to avoid being captured by private 
sector interest groups or by government political factions, and could ensure follow-up on 
their proposals.  This is particularly important in Guinea Bissau given the very high 
turnover in virtually all high level government positions.  The functions of these teams 
typically included: 
 
• Designing reform strategies which focus on a select number of policy obstacles; 
the key turned out to be the ability to agree on a set of priority reforms and focus 
on them, as the capacity to implement many policy reforms at once usually is not 
present;  
• Facilitating and leading an effective policy reform dialogue with the private sector 
to create a consensus for reform and in the process, identifying and nurturing 
“champions for change”; 
• Coaching political leaders and providing them with technical support to enable 
them to become more effective agents for change; 
• Bringing to bear their expertise in conducting critical policy negotiations with and 
on behalf of domestic and international companies; 
• Providing support in mobilizing and allocating resources for the implementation 
of strategies, particularly by coordinating donor support; and 
• Compelling the administration to act by agreeing with the implementing agencies 
on specific targets, budgets and responsibilities, monitoring their progress and 
suggesting corrective actions to the national leadership. 
                                                 
4 Alberto Criscuolo and Vincent Palmade: Reform Teams – How the Most Successful Reformers 
Organized Themselves, World Bank Public Policy for the Private Sector, Note No. 318, February 2008 
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The study identifies three key success factors shared by these teams which are: an 
appropriate mix of skills, an assured and continued access to key government decision 
makers, and adequate resources.   Also, in several of these countries the authorities had 
decided to install such reform teams during a period of profound change, following 
independence or civil war.    
 
Currently, there is no such reform entity in Guinea Bissau.  At one time, the most 
closely comparable institution would have been the INEP (Instituto Nacional de Estudos 
e Pesquisa – National Institute for Studies and Research) which played a key role in the 
preparation of “Djitu Ten”, the long-term Government Strategy Paper which was 
formulated in 1996 with a development vision covering a period until 2025.  As with 
other government institutions, INEP has suffered greatly from the civil war and continues 
to suffer from a lack of financial and human resources; being part of the Ministry of 
Education it enjoys limited independence or influence and its stability is undermined by 
frequent turnovers in the Ministry.   
 
     The National Cashew Council (NCC) is the institution responsible for advising 
Government on all issues related to the development of the most important sector of the 
economy.  However, due to its ambiguous organizational structure and inadequate 
resources it has so far been unable to play an effective coordinating role in developing a 
development strategy for the sector.  Moreover, as a sectoral organization it cannot be 
counted on to develop proposals for the reform of the general policy and regulatory 
environment. 
 
The Project Implementation Unit of the Private Sector Rehabilitation and 
Development Project (PSRDP) increasingly has contributed to the preparation of reform 
proposals, reaching out to different ministries and constituencies.  It has been given the 
responsibility for review and follow-up of the annual “Doing Business Survey” and so far, 
it has succeeded in reducing the startup time for new businesses and reducing the 
corporate income tax.  Its role in the reform process has become more visible since its 
organization of the 2007 public-private sector investment forum.  However, this forum 
has remained without significant follow-up and it is unclear whether the unit can sustain 
its work beyond the closing date of PSRDP, scheduled for early 2009.   
 
 
B. Recent Developments   
 
A proposal has been submitted with the African Capacity Building Foundation 
(ACBF)5 to establish a “Center for Strategic Transformation and Leadership” which 
                                                 
5 ACBF was established in 1991 by the World Bank, the African Development Bank and UNDP, 
and its membership comprises the IMF and 41 African and non-African countries.  Its mission 
is to build and strengthen indigenous capacity in macro-economic policy analysis and 
development in order to improve the quality of public policy and promote good governance 
and sustainable development.  It has helped set up and finance many of the think tanks and 
policy units across the continent.  
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would capitalize on the policy expertise that has been built up in the course of the PSRDP.  
The proposal calls for the creation of a private, independent and non-partisan center that 
would: 
 
• Conduct strategic analyses and, through a participatory process involving sectoral 
organizations and stakeholders, design sectoral development strategies and action 
plans; 
• Conduct regional planning analyses and formulate regional development 
strategies; 
• Analyze public finance procedures to improve budget formulation and public 
revenue generation; 
• Advocate for the implementation of existing recommendations by mobilizing 
stakeholders; and 
• Serve as a repository and custodian of national institutional memory in an 
environment of frequent changes in government structures. 
 
The mission and role of this center would be directly in line with the vision of Djitu 
Ten which has identified the need for the creation of such a capacity to achieve an 
improved policy environment.  The proposed governance structure of the center calls for 
linkages with members of the Diaspora, an approach which has proven to be particularly 
effective in a number of successful reforming countries.  If implemented as planned, this 
center could develop into a solid building block for a sustainable policy reform process. 
 
During its initial phase, the center would be largely dependent on outside financing 
but as the private sector develops and gains strength, it could evolve into a self-sustaining, 
independent reform entity, much like the Mauritius Joint Economic Council (JEC) and 
the Confederação das Associações Económicas de Moçambique (Mozambique 
Federation of Business Associations – CTA).  Both these organizations have established 
themselves as essential and effective partners to their Governments in the pursuit of 
economic development, and are largely financed by the contributions of their members 
which include multi-sectoral institutions such as the chambers of commerce, industry and 
agriculture, and sectoral associations. 
 
 
C.  Next Steps for Continued Policy Reform 
 
The key element that is currently missing in Guinea Bissau’s policy reform 
process and which has led to a situation where reform priorities fail to get addressed or 
adopted measures fail to get implemented, is the presence of a small dedicated and 
permanent team of experts that has been tasked to get the job done. The investment in 
human and physical resources required to make such a team effective would be relatively 
limited.  Far more important would be the buy-in among the highest levels of policy 
decision makers into the concept and their commitment to make it work. 
 
Once this commitment has been made, it would be useful to examine agencies 
with a similar mission, ranging from APIX (the Agence Nationale Chargée de la 
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Promotion de l’Investissement et des Grands Travaux) in neighboring Senegal, to the 
CTA in Mozambique and the JEC in Mauritius.  Given the Guinea Bissau environment, 
the entity should probably consist of a small team of experts with the resources to 
outsource specific technical assignments to domestic and international experts.  The 
lessons learned from the experiences elsewhere should be adapted to the context of the 
Guinea Bissau environment and this process should lead to decisions on such key aspects 
as the appropriate institutional set-up and governance structure, operating procedures, and 
a work plan for the startup phase. 
 
An essential part of the process would be that the work plan is regularly reviewed 
and updated and based on a consensus between the administration and the private sector 
on reform priorities.  The reform team should be charged with turning the public-private 
investment forum into a periodic event to monitor progress achieved on previously 
adopted reform proposals, and formulate a limited set of specific proposals for policy 
reform in the upcoming period. 
 
The 2006 DENARP includes a budget line for the reinforcement of macro-
economic management capacity.  A portion of this budget provision could be allocated to 
the reform team to be leveraged with donor funding.  While it can be envisioned that a 
combination of government and donor funding would finance the team during its initial 
years, a financing plan should be developed from the start to provide for the continuation 
of the team’s work once initial donor support has run out.  Given the interests at stake and 
the fact that the business community is an essential stakeholder to the reform process, it 
should be expected that the private sector gradually takes over an increasing portion of 
the budget.       
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 12
Table 1   -  Basic Social and Economic Data for Guinea Bissau 
  Guinea-Bissau Data Profile  
 2000 2005 2006 
People  
Population, total 1.4 million 1.6 million 1.6 million  
Population growth (annual %) 2.8 3.0 2.9  
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 44.5 45.1 ..  
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 7.1 7.1 ..  
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 132.0 124.0 ..  
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 215.0 200.0 ..  
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) 34.7 .. ..  
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children 
under 5) 
25.0 .. ..  
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 
months) 
59.0 80.0 ..  
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) .. 3.8 ..  
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age 
group) 
27.0 .. ..  
School enrollment, primary (% gross) 69.8 .. ..  
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 17.8 .. ..  
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 0.4 .. ..  
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary 
education (%) 
64.9 .. ..  
Environment  
Surface area (sq. km) 36,120.0 36,120.0 36,120.0  
Forest area (sq. km) 21,200.0 20,720.0 ..  
Agricultural land (% of land area) 57.9 .. ..  
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 0.2 .. ..  
Improved water source (% of population with access) 58.0 .. ..  
Improved sanitation facilities, urban (% of urban 
population with access) 
57.0 .. ..  
Economy  
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) 217.4 million 282.4 million 306.9 million  
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 160.0 180.0 190.0  
GDP (current US$) 215.5 million 301.1 million 304.5 million  
GDP growth (annual %) 7.5 3.5 4.2  
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 3.3 7.6 -3.8  
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 56.4 60.3 61.8  
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 13.0 11.7 11.5  
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 30.6 28.1 26.8  
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 31.8 37.7 42.2  
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 51.6 50.8 53.2  
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 11.3 14.6 17.2  
States and markets  
Time required to start a business (days) .. .. 233.0  
Military expenditure (% of GDP) 4.4 .. ..  
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people) 
8.1 .. ..  
Internet users (per 1,000 people) 2.2 19.5 ..  
Roads, paved (% of total roads) .. .. ..  
Global links  
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 14
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 56.2 72.4 60.8  
Net barter terms of trade (2000 = 100) 100.0 86.1 ..  
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current 
US$) 
702.3 
thousand 
10.0 million ..  
Long-term debt (DOD, current US$) 715.5 million 671.3 million ..  
Present value of debt (% of GNI) .. 289.8 ..  
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and 
income) 
.. .. ..  
Official development assistance and official aid (current 
US$) 
80.3 million 79.1 million ..  
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, 
received (US$) 
2.0 million 28.0 million 28.0 million  
Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2007
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Table 2.  Guinea-Bissau:  Real Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 2003-06 
(Constant 1986 prices) 
          2003  2004  2005  2006 
             
     (Percent of GDP) 
 
Agriculture, fishing and forestry      61.2   59.9    60.3    59.6 
Industry (including water and electricity)         9.0     8.9      8.7        9.0 
Construction           3.0     3.0      3.0        3.1  
Commerce, restaurants, and hotels        16.0   16.6    16.8    16.8 
Transport and communications        2.7     2.8      2.7        Banks, 
insurance, and other services         0.4     0.4      0.4       0.4 
Public administration           7.8     8.4        8.2         8.3 
  GDP at factor cost              100.0          100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
 
 
Source:  Ministry of Finance and IMF Staff estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Tax Revenue 2005-2007 (Millions of CFA) 
 
 
 2005 2006 2007 
 
Total Receipts 27,978.0 32,106.3 26,618.3 
        
Tax Receipts 18,333.7 18,473.6 18,793.0 
        
Direct Taxes 4,113.4 4,621.7 4,710.4 
  0.0     
Indirect Taxes 14,220.2 13,851.8 14,082.6 
Taxes on International Transactions 6,426.0 6,807.1 7,027.5 
Tariffs (DI) 3,754.4 4,479.3 4207.4 
Fuel 858.6     
Rice 678.4     
Other Imports 2,217.4     
Export Taxes 0.0     
Cashew export tax 2,009.8 1,606.2 1897.9 
Customs Services Tax 0.0 721.6   
Others 661.8   922.2 
Community Solidarity Tax (ICS) 254.1   101.0 
Computer Tax (RS-1%) 266.9   102.0 
Economic Community Tax (PC-
CDEAO) 140.9   51.6 
 
Source:  Ministry of Finance and IMF Staff Estimates 
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Table 4 Guinea-Bissau--External Debt Service 
(in millions of CFAF) 
              
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
    Budget Projections 
       
Exchange rate CFAF/US$ (p.a.) 580.1 527.6 526.6 522.4 478.6 445.9
       
Scheduled interest 7,155 6,699 6,088 5,515 4,496 3,918
IMF 132 98 64 35 25 15
IDA 1,024 1,032 1,227 1,152 1,034 988
AfDB/ADF 324 292 302 541 487 440
Others 5,675 5,277 4,495 3,787 2,950 2,474
BOAD    25   
BID    179   
BADEA    30   
SAUDI FUND    24   
Others 5,675 5,277 4,495 3,529 2,950 2,474
       
Scheduled amortization 16,469 19,856 21,716 19,443 14,189 12,800
IMF 910 2,558 2,815 1,545 1,887 1,473
IDA 1,867 2,133 2,625 2,928 2,849 2,874
AfDB/ADF 1,023 782 767 1,633 1,499 1,401
Others 12,669 14,383 15,509 13,337 7,955 7,051
Nigeria Trust Fund 58  
BADEA 70  
SAUDI FUND    79   
KUWAIT FUND    268   
Others 12,669 14,383 15,509 12,862 7,955 7,051
       
Actual interest 1,480 1,422 1,593 1,986 1,546 1,444
IMF 132 98 64 35 25 15
IDA 1,024 1,032 1,227 1,152 1,034 988
AfDB/ADF 324 292 302 541 487 440
Others 0 0 0 258 0 0
BOAD    25   
BID    179   
BADEA    30   
SAUDI FUND    24   
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0
 17
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Actual amortization 3,816 5,487 6,221 6,581 6,246 5,749
IMF 910 2,558 2,815 1,545 1,887 1,473
IDA 1,867 2,133 2,625 2,928 2,849 2,874
AfDB/ADF 1,023 782 767 1,633 1,499 1,401
Others 15 14 14 475 12 0
       
Debt relief 4,239 4,239 4,536 5,846 5,481 5,333
Interest 1,348 1,324 1,406 1,578 1,418 1,345
IMF 0 0 0 0 0 15
IDA 1,024 1,032 1,104 1,037 931 889
AfDB/ADF 324 292 302 541 487 440
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0
Principal 2,890 2,914 3,130 4,268 4,063 3,988
IMF 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDA 1,867 2,133 2,363 2,635 2,564 2,587
AfDB/ADF 1,023 782 767 1,633 1,499 1,401
Others      0
       
Change in arrears 18,329 19,646 19,990 16,391 10,893 9,526
Interest 5,675 5,277 4,495 3,529 2,950 2,474
IMF 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDA 0 0 0 0 0 0
AfDB/ADF 0 0 0 0 0 0
Others 5,675 5,277 4,495 3,529 2,950 2,474
Principal 12,653 14,370 15,495 12,862 7,943 7,051
IMF 0 0 0 0 0 0
IDA 0 0 0 0 0 0
AfDB/ADF 0 0 0 0 0 0
Others 12,653 14,370 15,495 12,862 7,943 7,051
 
Table 5.  Guinea-Bissau:  Merchandise Exports, f.o.b., 2000-06 
 
 
               2000        2001         2002      2003         2004        2005       2006 
                               Prel. 
    (Millions of U.S. dollars)   
Total merchandise exports 62.1 50 53.6 62.2 75.8 89.6 61.5
        
Agricultural products 60.7 48.5 49 56.7 73.2 85.1 56.7
    Groundnuts 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 0.1
0.3 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1
er 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ther 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 
    Cotton 0.5 1.3 1.6 0.9 0.1 0 0
    Cashew nuts 
ther
59.8 47.2 47.3 55.7 72.8 84.9 56.5
    O   
Fish products 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.9 1
    Fish   0 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.7
    Shrimp 
th
0.1 0.8 0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3
    O   
Wood products 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.2
    Swan wood 0.1 0 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2
    Logs 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0 0 0
    O   
Miscellaneous 0.8 0.2 3.6 4.5 2.1 3.4 3.6
        
Unit prices   (U.S. dollars per metric ton)   
    Groundnuts 786 753 655 856 910 769 829
    Cotton 59 48 46 63 62 55 58
    Cashew nuts 817 600 546 581 721 747 613
    Fish 452 530 646 650 693 744 1,074
    Shrimp 3,029 3,098 3,121 3,304 3,304 3,304 4,769
    Swan wood 285 283 273 284 324 328 342
    Logs 181 158 146 146 174 182 187
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Table 6.  Guinea-Bissau:  Merchandise Imports, c.i.f.., 2000-06 
 
 
               2000         2001         2002         2003         2004           2005       2006 
                                        Est. 
   (Millions of U.S. dollars)   
Total merchandise imports 86.3 95.2 85.4 85.8 116.2 123.4 134.1
.        
Foodstuffs 21.5 14.8 17 25.8 19.1 26.5 31.2
    Rice 13.9 9.2 11.8 18.2 12.7 16.8 14.8
    Wheat flour 1.5 1.2 1.4 2.5 1.8 3.4 5.5
    Sugar 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.3 3.8
    Oil 2.8 1.1 1.5 2.1 1 1.3 1.8
    Dairy products 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.8 1.9
    Others 2.5 2.7 1.1 1.8 1.9 3 3.4
        
Beverages and tobacco 6 4.9 4.9 5.5 4.9 6.9 6.6
        
Other consumer goods 4.7 4.1 3.9 5 9.8 9.3 10.4
    Clothing and shoes 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.5 0.8 0.5
    Durable consumer goods 2.8 3.7 3.7 4.5 5.7 3.7 4.7
    Nondurable consumer goods 1.4 0 0 0 2.6 4.8 5.2
        
Petroleum products 4.7 5.5 5.5 8.7 12.5 16.7 21.1
    Diesel and gasoline 4.4 5.1 5 7.7 8.9 13.8 19.2
    Gas 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.4 0 0
    Other 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.7 2.2 2.8 1.9
        
Construction material 6.5 2.8 4.2 7.2 12.5 7.6 7.4
        
Transport equipment 9.4 6.3 4.5 4.9 10.2 7.5 8
    Passenger vehicles 5.2 4.5 3.2 3.4 7.5 5 5.8
 20
    Freight vehicles 3.4 1.4 1 1.1 2.1 2 1.5
    Vehicle parts 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7
        
Electrical equipment/machinery 5.4 3.7 2.3 6 10.6 7.4 5.4
        
Parts, accessories, and others 0.2 1 0.7 1.6 0.2 1 3.4
        
Nonregistered trade 27.9 52.1 42.4 21.1 36.4 40.6 40.5
 
 
  Source:  Central Bank of West African States, and IMF staff estimates. 
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Table 7.  Guinea-Bissau:  Direction of Trade, 2000-06 
(Percent of total) 
 
 
       2000         2001         2002       2003         2004            2005         2006            
Ex  ports        
  Industrial Countries 4.2 3.8 9.8 13 27.4 4.3 2.8
    France 0.7 0 0.2 0.3 0 0 0
    Netherlands 0.1 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0
    Portugal 1.1 1.8 2.9 2.6 0.8 1.1 1
    Spain 0 0 0.3 0.1 0 0 0
    United States 0.4 0 0 2.6 22.2 0.2 0.3
    Other 1.9 2 6.3 7.4 4 2.7 1.5
        
  Africa 1.5 2.4 4.5 19.1 15 21.4 18.4
    Cape Verde 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
    Gambia, The 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
    Guinea 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.9 0.2 0.3 0.3
    Nigeria 0.7 0.4 2.5 15.7 13.2 19 17.3
    Senegal 0 0 0 0.9 1.1 1.5 0
    Other 0.5 1.4 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6
        
  Asia 48 77 61.7 62.5 54.1 69.7 74.7
    China 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0
    Thailand 0.2 31.2 23.8 0 0.2 0 0
    India 45 44.5 36.1 62.3 52.2 67.4 72.7
    Other 2.9 1.2 1.8 0 1.6 2.1 2
        
  Other 46.2 16.9 23.9 5.3 3.5 4.5 4.1
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  Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
        
  Imports        
    Industrial countries 47.2 41.6 46 36.6 32.3 45.1 43.3
        France 3.6 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.5 2.9
        Germany 1.5 1.7 2.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.9
        Italy 2 2.1 3.4 8 3.7 20.4 12.2
        Netherlands 3.1 3.4 3.6 2.9 4 3 3.5
        Portugal 26.8 20.7 20.9 13.3 13.8 12.7 17.6
        Spain 1.2 1.8 2.5 404 2.3 1.2 1.6
        Sweden 0.2 0.4 0.2 0 0.9 0.3 0.5
        United Kingdom 1.8 2.2 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.7
        Other 7.1 6.5 8.5 3.7 3.9 4.1 3.5
        
 
 
Source:  IMF Article IV Statistical Annex, November 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8:  Balance of Payments 2005-2007  (Billions of CFA) 
 
 2005 2006 2007
  
Goods and services -26.8 -54.8 -35.6
Goods  -8.7 -34.2 -23.4
Exports, f.o.b 47.2 29.0 31.7
Of which: cashew nuts 44.7 26.6 29.0
Imports, f.o.b -55.9 -63.2 -55.1
Of which: food products -26.7 -34.3 -27.1
Of which: petroleum products -16.8 -23.2 -19.3
    
Services (net) -18.1 -20.6 -12.2
Credit 2.6 4.7 4.4
Debit  -20.7 -25.3 -16.5
    
Income (interest scheduled) -6.3 -4.5 -3.3
    
Current transfers (net) 25.0 35.8 30.2
Official 1, 2 12.1 21.6 17.0
Of which: balance of payments support grants  5.1 10.2 17.0
Of which: EU fishing compensation 4.8 4.8 0.0
Private 12.9 14.2 13.2
Of which: fishing license fees 2.8 2.4 0.0
Current account    
Including official transfers -8.0 -23.5 -8.7
Excluding official transfers  -15.4 -40.3 -25.7
Excluding official transfers and interest payments  -9.1 -35.8 -22.4
    
Capital and financial balance -5.4 4.8 7.3
Capital account 3 23.7 17.4 12.1
Financial account -29.1 -12.6 -4.7
Official medium- and long-term disbursements 6.2 8.8 11.6
Balance of payments support 0.0 0.0 0.0
Projects 6.2 8.8 11.6
Scheduled amortization -17.9 -12.3 -11.3
Treasury bills and regional financing 10.0 -1.1 -1.3
Commercial bank net foreign assets 3.1 -4.6 1.1
Private net foreign assets and errors and omissions 4 -30.5 -3.4 -4.8
    
Overall balance -13.4 -18.7 -1.3
    
Financing 13.4 18.7 1.3
    
Net foreign assets (increase -) 4 -10.3 3.0 -10.5
    Of which: net IMF credits  -1.1 -2.2 -1.9
Purchases and loans 0.0 0.0 0.0
Repurchases and repayments -1.1 -2.2 -1.9
    
Debt relief 5.3 4.9 3.4
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Change in debt-service arrears (decrease -) 17.1 10.9 9.5
    
Gross Financing gap 0.0 -0.1 -1.1
    
Of which: net IMF credits    
    
Memorandum items    
Export volume growth (percent) 0.8 -18.3 14.1
Import volume growth (percent) 16.7 16.3 -15.5
Scheduled debt service    
Percent of exports and service credits 48.5 49.8 40.6
Percent of total government revenue 86.4 53.3 55.0
   Trade balance (Percent of GDP) -16.9 -34.1 -20.7
Current account balance (percent of GDP)    
Including official transfers -5.1 -15.9 -5.6
Excluding official transfers -9.8 -30.6 -16.7
Stock of external arrears, end of period 152.6 163.4 173.0
Overall balance (percent of GDP) -8.4 -11.6 -0.8
Gross Financing gap (percent of GDP) 0.0 -0.1 -0.6
      
Sources: BCEAO and IMF staff estimates and projections.   
    
1 Including food aid and technical assistance to projects.    
2 For 2007, official transfers excludes Angola.    
3 Excludes proposed 2008 EPCA drawings.    
4 Excludes the financing gap, BCEAO includes the finacing gap in the capital account . 
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Table 9. Guinea-Bisaau:  Output of Main Crops, 1997-2006 
(Thousands of metric tons) 
 
                                       1997        1998        1999         2000        2001        2002        2003        2004        2005        2006 
 Rice 137.8 124 138.7 80.2 88.4 87.9 88.3 89.1 98.3 106
Other cereals 61.8 55.6 59.4 62 75.8 66.8 58.9 75.4 79.5 83.6
Manioc 31.7 32 32 32 34 34 38 38 38 38
Sweet potatoes 22.5 14.6 25.7 26.8 27.8 29.2 29.6 29.3 29.3 29.3
Coconut 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Sugarcane 72.5 48.4 24.4 25 25.6 26.9 27.2 28.3 29.4 30.4
Vegetables 9.2 7 7.4 7.5 7.7 7.9 8 8.2 8.3 8.5
Fresh fruit 327.4 278.3 333.9 283.9 340.6 289.5 247.4 295.3 354.4 301.2
  Of which:  
cashews 258.5 195 308 87.6 91.1 94.8 98.6 102.5 106.6 103
Cashew nuts 51.7 39 65 77 78 87.9 87.9 87 97 93.7
Groundnuts 15.8 12 12.5 16.2 16.7 17.2 17.7 18.2 18.8 19.3
Cotton 0.6 1.8 1.4 1.9 1.6 1.6 4.5 4.5 2.7 2.7
 
 
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture and IMF Article 4 report, November 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Map of Guinea Bissau 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Source:  IMF 
Figure 3 
 
Source:  IMF Article IV Report, August 2007 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 Sources of Revenue 
 
Source:  IMF 
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Figure 6 
 
Source:  IMF 
Figure 7 
 
Source:  IMF Article IV Report, August 2007 
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